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University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill
Check out ESPN, listen to “Mike and Mike” or any sports talk radio, and open 
any newspaper, and there will be a lot of buzz about student-athletes being forced 
into indentured servitude while the university makes millions off of them. Attacks 
against the NCAA seem to be coming from all directions—the media, the fans, the 
member schools, and past and present student-athletes. These complaints are also 
making their way into the legal system, with lawsuits and administrative actions filed 
claiming unfair rules, unfair compensation, unacceptable health risks and failure 
to educate. This essay examines and addresses the major criticisms of the current 
model of intercollegiate athletics, with a focus on claims that student-athletes are 
exploited because everyone else in college athletics is making money.
The “Business” of College Sport
The most repeated complaint about college athletics is that it is a “business” or “com-
mercial activity.” The NCAA reported $797,598,000 in revenue for the 2012–2013 
fiscal year (NCAAa, 2014). Television and marketing rights fees account for 90% 
of NCAA revenues, with championships ticket sales providing almost 9% and 
membership fees and other services accounting for less than 1% (NCAAa, 2014). 
However, revenues paint only one-half of a budget picture. The NCAA is a voluntary 
membership, nonprofit organization. The national headquarters in Indianapolis and 
employees of the NCAA only exist to serve its members, the almost 1,100 colleges 
and universities that choose to join the association. Maintaining and managing 
the national office and providing services to the membership accounts for almost 
20% of the NCAA’s expenses (NCAAa, 2014). Another 16% of the budget is spent 
providing championships opportunities for student-athletes, and the remainder is 
distributed back to Division I members through their conferences (NCAAa, 2014). 
This places the NCAA squarely in the middle of nonprofit organizations relative to 
their mission-to-overhead spending ratio, with more than 80% of revenues going 
to support their mission. Some nonprofit organizations such as the American Red 
Cross do a little better, with approximately 92% of their income going to program-
ming, but other well-respected nonprofits such as the American Cancer Society 
spend only 59% of its revenue on its charitable purpose (Delp, 2014).
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Corporate sponsorships, media rights, licensing, merchandise and ticket sales 
are also cited as “proof” of commercialization in college sport. Billions of dollars 
flow through college athletics programs–over $8 billion dollars in revenue at 230 
public institutions that are members of NCAA Division I (USA Today, 2014)—but 
this alone is not enough to categorize an athletics department as a commercial 
enterprise. In 2012–2103, the University of Texas reported income of $165,691,486 
(USA Today, 2014). While this is an incredible amount of money, other units on 
campus are also expected to generate significant amounts of income. No one is 
complaining about the millions of dollars generated by the chemistry department 
or the billions of dollars raised by the development office. Generating revenue is 
part of the business of education. The difference between a purely commercial 
model (professional sport) and the educational model is the purpose for generat-
ing revenue: in a commercial entity, the purpose is to make a profit, whereas in an 
educational institution, the purpose is to finance the opportunity for student-athletes 
to participate.
While billions of dollars flowed into Division I college athletics programs, 
billions are also being spent to provide athletics participation opportunities for 
student-athletes. Data provided by the NCAA reported only 20 Division I Foot-
ball Bowl Subdivision (FBS) schools with revenues that exceeded their expenses 
(NCAAb, 2014). However, a USA Today database of 230 NCAA Division I public 
institutions revealed only seven athletics programs that did not receive some sort 
of subsidy from their institution (USA Today, 2014). The average net loss for Divi-
sion I schools in the Big 5 conferences was $2.3 million, and the remaining FBS 
institutions averaged a deficit of $17.6 million (Burnsed, 2014).
Providing athletics participation opportunities is expensive, with the larg-
est line items paying for salaries, direct sport expenses (travel, equipment, etc.), 
scholarships, facilities, and other administrative and support services such as 
sports medicine, academic support, strength and conditioning, nutrition, and sport 
psychology. Investment in goods and services that directly enhance the student-
athlete’s experience varies tremendously across institutions, but to claim that 
student-athletes only receive compensation in the form of tuition, room, board, 
books and fees grossly underestimates the overall tangible benefit of athletics 
participation.
The benefits that student-athletes receive (most commonly minimized by refer-
ence as only a scholarship) are often compared with coaches’ salaries to establish 
that college athletics is a business and/or that student-athletes are undercompen-
sated. Educational institutions, as nonprofit organizations, pay employees reason-
able compensation for their efforts (World Family Corporation v. Comm’r, 1983). 
Although many may argue that paying a football or men’s basketball coach a mul-
timillion dollar salary–making the coach the highest paid employee on campus–is 
unreasonable, the legal determination of a reasonable salary is based on the market 
rate (Treas. Reg. § 1.162–7(b)(3), 2014). When considering total compensation, 
coaches’ employment packages may not differ significantly from other superstar 
employees within the university such as doctors or scientists with supplemental 
income from grants or patents. In addition, paying a coach a high salary is another 
of the benefits that flows to student-athletes through their participation—it is the 
student-athlete who benefits from the coach’s services; those highly paid coaches 
are often the reason student-athletes choose to attend that institution.
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The Legal Relationship Between Student-Athlete 
and Institution
The student-athlete/university relationship is primarily contractual in nature, as is 
the relationship between the university and its students (Mitten, Davis, Shropshire, 
Osborne & Smith, 2012). When a student-athlete signs a financial aid agreement, 
she or he enters into a contractual relationship with the university whereby the 
institution promises to provide an athletics scholarship/financial aid in exchange 
for the student-athlete to participate in the college athletics program, stay academi-
cally eligible and follow institutional, conference, and national governing body 
rules (Mitten et al., 2012). Just as a financial aid agreement is calculated each year 
a student attends the institution, athletics scholarships have historically been valid 
for one year, renewable at the discretion of the institution. Criticisms that this 
relationship unfairly disadvantages student-athletes have led to new permissive 
NCAA legislation that allows institutions to offer multiyear scholarships (Bylaw 
15.02.7, 2014). Multiyear scholarships do benefit student-athletes by allowing them 
to negotiate a guaranteed length for their potential value to any particular athletics 
program, and by providing security from annual scholarship nonrenewal due to 
disagreements with a coach or change in program direction when a new coach is 
hired. However, the potential risks of multiyear scholarships for student-athletes are 
rarely acknowledged. First, student-athletes still risk losing a multiyear scholarship 
contract if they are not academically eligible or break rules. Next, student-athletes 
who seek to transfer may find that their institution might not only refuse to issue a 
transfer waiver (as allowed by NCAA rules), but could seek a negative injunction 
prohibiting that player from competing for any other institution during the term of 
the multiyear scholarship as allowed by the courts for breach of contract (Ameri-
can Association Baseball Club v. Pickett, 1890; Cain v. Garner, 1916; Cincinnati 
Exhibition Co. v. Marsans, 1914; Madison Square Garden Corp. v. Camera, 1931; 
Philadelphia Ball Club v. Lajoie, 1902).
Participation in athletics is viewed as a privilege by the legal system. This 
is a concept that seems frequently forgotten. Student-athletes are not entitled to 
participate in college athletics; it is a privilege (with many benefits) to participate, 
and with privilege comes responsibility. If student-athletes are not happy with their 
situation as student-athletes, they do not have to participate.
Student-Athlete Compensation
The popular criticisms that student-athletes are being cheated in some way because 
the university is profiting from their labor and they don’t get anything in return are 
ridiculous. All student-athletes are very well compensated for their participation, 
with $2.7 billion in athletics scholarships provided to more than 150,000 student-
athletes each year (NCAAc, 2014). Those student-athletes with full athletics 
scholarships have the value of a free education while the average student nationally 
graduates with $28,400 of debt (Reed & Cochrane, 2014), but all student-athletes, 
even walk-ons and those who only receive partial funding, benefit from coaching, 
facilities, clothing, and equipment for training and competition, travel experiences, 
and services received for academic support, strength and conditioning, sports 
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nutrition, sports medicine, and even leadership training and life skills workshops. 
All of these experiences and services have value, with USA Today reporting a value 
of $120,000 for Division I men’s basketball players (Weiner & Berkowitz, 2011). 
Rishe (2011) found that the “average value of a college football scholarship is in 
excess of $2 million for student-athletes who (1) play for one of the pre-season 
Top 25 schools and (2) would not have pursued a college degree if it weren’t for 
their scholarship” (P 2). There are also intangible benefits developed or acquired 
through athletics participation such as leadership skills, the ability to work within a 
team toward a common goal, time management and task prioritization, and persis-
tence, that have real value in the workplace and in life (Chalfin, Weight, Osborne, 
& Johnson, in review; Plunkett, Weight, Osborne, & Lancaster, in press; Weight, 
Navarro, Huffman, Smith-Ryan, in press).
Note that the term “student-athlete” is intended in its all-inclusive meaning. 
Most complaints about unfair treatment of student-athletes are really addressing 
only football and men’s basketball, although these athletes make up less than seven 
percent of all student-athletes. In the O’Bannon v. NCAA (2014) lawsuit, Division 
I football and men’s basketball players were able to certify as a class, and the 
plaintiffs’ successfully argued that these student-athletes should be treated differ-
ently. From an equal protection model, an economic model, and most particularly 
the educational model (which is the world within which college athletics exists), 
football and men’s basketball players should not be treated differently than any 
other student-athlete.
From an equal protection model, football players and basketball players practice 
and play games—the same as every other student-athlete on any other intercollegiate 
team. All student-athletes have demanding schedules that include classes, home-
work and/or study hall, practices, time in the training room for preventative and/or 
therapeutic purposes, strength and conditioning, competition and travel. Although 
football and men’s basketball players are often taught from a young age that they 
are special, the only difference between them and the other student-athletes is that 
the sports they play are popular with the media and fans. Being able to compete 
in front of large crowds or on television is an additional intangible benefit that 
football and men’s basketball players receive that others don’t, but it shouldn’t 
warrant entitlements for those athletes.
From an economic model, football players and men’s basketball players already 
receive more in tangible benefits than most other student-athletes. These two sports 
on average constitute 78% of spending for men’s sports in Division I (Fagan & 
Cyphers, 2012). Football offers 85 full scholarships; this is the equivalent of 2 1/2–3 
full squads, depending on how you count special teams! This scholarship ratio also 
holds true for men’s and women’s basketball, but few other sports are allocated 
enough scholarship equivalents for even one complete starting lineup. Football and 
men’s basketball teams also generally practice and play in the largest facilities, are 
coached by the best (definitely the best paid) coaches, and have dedicated strength 
and conditioning and sports medicine staff and facilities. Luxury locker rooms, 
big screen televisions in recreational lounges, and staying in hotel rooms the night 
before home games are all added benefits that these student-athletes receive that 
others don’t. In Division III, football and men’s basketball are allocated an average 
of 41% of men’s athletics team budgets, an amount proportionate to the number of 
participation opportunities those sports offer. An economic model that treats football 
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and men’s basketball players the same as every other student-athlete would save 
athletics departments millions of dollars!
College athletics exists because it is an extension of the educational experience. 
In higher education, resources are allocated based on programming needs. Depart-
ment allocations are generally based on the number of students in majors, not on 
how much money an academic department generates. Tuition is standardized for all 
students—students in English do not pay more tuition than students in Chemistry 
even though revenue generation through external grants is substantially higher in 
the sciences than the liberal arts. The educational model treats all students the same 
and utilizes institutional revenues across all programs. College athletics programs 
similarly, and appropriately, use all department revenues to provide opportunities 
for student-athletes in all sports.
Student-Athletes Are Not Employees
Although student-athletes are very well compensated (as previously discussed), 
compensation does not make them employees of the university. In March 2014, 
the Chicago Regional Director of the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB) 
issued a ruling granting scholarship football players at Northwestern University the 
right to collectively bargain under the National Labor Relations Act (NLRB Case 
13-RC-121359, 2014). This decision was based predominantly on the conclusion 
that the football players met the definition of “employees” under Section 2(3) of 
the Act: “…[P]layers receiving scholarships to perform football-related services 
for the Employer under a contract for hire in return for compensation are subject 
to the Employer’s control and are therefore employees within the meaning of the 
Act.” Northwestern University has requested that the full National Labor Relations 
Board overturn the ruling because the regional director ignored key evidence and 
the congressional intent of the NLRA, misunderstood the cooperative educational 
relationship between the university and student-athletes and the primarily educa-
tional function of intercollegiate athletics (Northwestern University Brief, 2014).
Some will argue that football players with professional aspirations have to 
play college sport even if they are not interested in academics. First, from a legal 
perspective, attending college is always a choice—no one is legally forced to go. 
But even the small percentage of student-athletes who are primarily focused on 
a future professional career in sport are making a choice that is similar to that of 
all students attending colleges or universities. Students generally attend college 
seeking the opportunity to gain knowledge and skill that will help them succeed 
in a career and in life. The future pro chooses to participate in college athletics 
because he sees it as the best route to a professional career; the college experience 
is a better training ground and provides significantly greater visibility than other 
available alternatives. This is no different than any other student seeking a specific 
professional career opportunity. If a student desires a job in a particular career, for 
example medicine or engineering, they still have to take all university required 
courses before being eligible for that career field. Similarly, being eligible doesn’t 
guarantee a career in that profession.
Aside from the Northwestern NLRB decision, past NLRB precedents as well as 
common law decisions indicate student-athletes are not employees (Coleman v. Western 
Mich. Univ., 1983; Rensing v. Ind. State Univ., 1983). First, a student-athlete cannot 
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participate without being a student, maintaining academic eligibility, and making 
progress toward a degree. The time spent participating in athletics-related activities 
versus academics is arbitrary—there is wide fluctuation across the student body in 
the amount of time students spend in class and studying versus all other activities.
In the NLRB decision, an athletic scholarship is considered the equivalent 
of pay (Northwestern University and CAPA, 2014). By this logic, students who 
receive academic scholarships could also be considered employees just by attend-
ing class. Similarly, there is no logic in the decision that only scholarship football 
players are employees and therefore eligible to unionize, when walk-ons engage 
in exactly the same “work” activity by participating in football. By extension, all 
student-athletes in all sports should also be employees, because they all engage in 
the same “work.” This is the premise of a lawsuit filed on October 20, 2014 in federal 
court by Samantha Sackos, a former college soccer player, against the NCAA and 
all Division I member institutions (Sackos v. NCAA, 2014). Relying on the defini-
tion of employee used by the NLRB in the Northwestern decision, Sackos claims 
that all student-athletes should be paid minimum hourly wages for their athletics 
participation, but that an athletics scholarship is not the equivalent of pay. While 
Sackos advocates that all student-athletes engage in the same activities, she fails 
to recognize that while student-athletes work hard at their sports, participation in 
athletics is not a job—it is an extracurricular activity. If a student-athlete doesn’t 
feel that the benefits of athletics participation (tangible and intangible) are worth 
the time and effort expended engaged in that activity, then he or she can choose to 
participate in other activities!
The underlying premise of these cases is that student-athletes make all this 
money for the institution and/or the NCAA, and they get peanuts in return. First, 
student-athletes do not generate revenue. Student-athletes train and play games, 
whether anyone watches their performance on the court, field, pool, rink or track. 
Some sports attract more fans that are willing to watch their games, but spectators 
do not change the nature of what student-athletes do, nor does it turn those athletes 
into revenue generators. The sports are revenue generators, and athletic depart-
ment employees in the ticket office, in marketing, and in athletics development/
fundraising generate revenue.
Criticisms that student-athletes (specifically football and men’s basketball 
players) are not fairly compensated often make comparisons with other students 
who are paid for their skills or talent. Students who act, sing, or write are paid for 
their performances, right? Although these students may receive scholarships for 
their special talents, the institution does not invest significant amounts of resources 
beyond the classroom to develop those talents, nor do those students represent the 
university (on teams, in competition, wearing uniforms bearing the institution’s 
name) the way that student-athletes do. Comparisons are also made with students 
who are paid for their participation in extracurricular activities such as student 
government or the campus newspaper; while these students may be paid, they typi-
cally do not receive scholarships or any other tangible benefits for the services they 
provide. These critics ignore the most obvious student comparison—the intern. It 
is well recognized that the best way to get a job in the sport industry is through an 
internship. There is little difference between the student-athlete and a sport man-
agement intern—both work long hours trying to gain skills that will make them 
more marketable in the workplace.
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In the Northwestern NLRB decision (2014), it was determined that scholar-
ships were compensation; the Sackos complaint (2014) claims that scholarships 
are not appropriate pay. Rather than quibble about whether scholarships are the 
“compensation” that make student-athletes employees, a simple solution is to go 
nonscholarship. In the early days of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for 
Women (AIAW), athletic scholarships were prohibited because they put emphasis 
on athletics over academics, and the pressure to earn or keep a scholarship gave 
coaches undue power over student-athletes. Eliminating athletic scholarships would 
bring balance to the academics/athletics struggle and remove any indicia of payment 
to student-athletes. Funding no longer needed for athletics scholarships could be 
used to provide broader athletics participation opportunities. No one would lose 
current participation opportunities, as those with financial need could still receive 
financial aid. By eliminating the lure of college athletics scholarships, emphasis 
on athletics success in youth sport might be tempered as well.
Another alternative suggested relative to paying student-athletes is to let athletes 
negotiate their own compensation in a free market. These advocates of pay for play 
ignore that the current system (and even the nonscholarship system introduced in 
the preceding paragraph) already allows student-athletes to make free market deci-
sions. Although NCAA rules limit how a student-athlete is compensated, it does 
not limit the value that the student-athlete receives. The value of an education, 
cost of tuition, room, board, books, fees, and cost of attendance, plus the bundle of 
athletics related benefits and services varies tremendously across institutions. Add 
to this the opportunity to negotiate multiyear scholarships (and possibly trust funds 
if the O’Bannon decision holds). Recruits evaluate all of these factors in choosing 
the school that best fits their needs.
Proponents of a free market system assume that football and men’s basketball 
players would be paid more. While that is certainly a possibility if a free market was 
added to the current baseline, but in a true free market a very small number of elite 
athletes would be paid more, while the majority of football players would likely be 
paid less. The current system provides full scholarships for 85 football players and 
13 men’s basketball players. Some student-athletes on a football team may never 
play in a single game, and many will have very limited playing time—should this 
level of talent merit a full scholarship? A free market system that eliminates full 
scholarships and sets a team equivalency at the current 85/13 scholarship level 
for the football and men’s basketball teams to better compensate the superstars 
would be preferred over eliminating participation opportunities overall to finance 
increased payments.
The Burden of Receiving an Education 
is on the Student-Athlete
Football players and men’s basketball players have been taught that they are spe-
cial, and that they are entitled to more than other athletes. But this mentality also 
short-changes them, because the cultural message they receive from the time they 
are relatively young is that athletic ability is more important than academic suc-
cess. In our current economy, the value of a college degree has never been higher. 
Workers with a college degree earn 98% more per hour than those without, and 
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are 75% less likely to be unemployed (Lowe, 2014). Putting all one’s eggs in the 
athletics basket is a huge gamble. This is not just a college athletics problem—this 
is a societal problem.
In an ideal world, all student-athletes would value their academic experience 
at least equally with their athletics experience. The majority of student-athletes 
do care about their education and overall graduation rates for student-athletes are 
higher than nonathlete graduation rates (Brutlag Hosick, 2014). Unfortunately, 
some athletes assume that their special talent will compensate for any academic 
deficiencies, and this message is reinforced by the actions of some educators, 
coaches and administrators through middle school and high school. While pos-
sibly well intentioned, these individuals and those messages sell the athlete short. 
If the “reason” for passing someone through is to give them the opportunity to get 
a college scholarship, the scholarship is meaningless if they do not have the tools, 
skills, or mentality to do the work.
Fueled by the recent academic scandal at the University of North Carolina at 
Chapel Hill, some “reformers” are calling for the elimination of special admissions 
policies that allow recruits who do not meet institutional averages to be admitted. 
This is misguided because half of the students at any institution are admitted with 
credentials that are below average. Granted, institutions that admit student-athletes 
who are truly not capable of doing college level work are unethical, but if a special 
talent admissions committee truly believes that a recruit might be able to do the 
work if given the opportunity and appropriate academic support, shouldn’t schools 
have the autonomy to make those decisions? From a public policy perspective, isn’t 
it more discriminatory to eliminate an entire class of people from the opportunity 
to be educated, than to allow those who are perceived to have potential try, even if 
a few fall short along the way? Each institution should track their special admis-
sions to see if their risks are paying off. Admitting student-athletes with academic 
deficiencies requires the institution to provide appropriate resources to assist 
them so that they can be academically successful. Note the distinction between 
this philosophy and end-goal compared with providing resources to keep at-risk 
student-athletes academically eligible to participate. Because it may be impossible 
on the surface to determine which philosophy student-athletes, coaches, tutors, or 
faculty buy into, the institution has a responsibility to put safeguards in place to 
promote the former and deter the latter.
One might argue that athletics-academic support programs would not be neces-
sary if only those student-athletes who meet average university standards are admit-
ted. I disagree. Programs that assist student-athletes with time management skills 
and provide tutoring to compensate for the amount of time athletes spend training 
and competing are reasonable. Again, the purpose for these programs cannot be to 
do the work for them or to allow them to major in eligibility. Academic counselors 
should not control student-athletes’ choice of courses and/or majors. This creates 
restrictions that are not commensurate with the privilege of playing college athletics 
and countermands the purpose of being in college—to get an education.
Providing opportunities for academically at-risk student-athletes and appropri-
ate academic support is only worthwhile if the student-athlete commits to being 
educated. The courts are very clear in this regard—the burden of receiving an 
education falls on the student.
Myth of the Exploited Student-Athlete  151
Conclusion
This is a critical moment in the history of college sport, and decisions that will 
impact the future of intercollegiate athletics need to be made carefully, thoughtfully 
and deliberately. While imperfect, the current system has provided opportunities 
for millions of student-athletes. The examples critics use illustrating problems 
with the current system are the exceptions, not the norm. Neither the exceptions, 
nor the demands of football and men’s basketball players, should bring down the 
entire enterprise. If an athlete does not have the interest or intention of receiving 
an education, he or she should not participate in college athletics. College athletes 
are not hired as employees of the university—and they are not denied “free market” 
compensation for their athletic talents—they can take their talents to professional, 
semiprofessional, or developmental leagues. They do not have to play college athlet-
ics, and college athletics will survive without them. The opportunity to participate 
in college athletics requires participation in college education. These are the rules. 
If you don’t like the rules, don’t play!
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